A middle way for mindfulness
Relational enaction and analogical hermeneutics, or why epistemology matters when we practise and teach mindfulness.
Mindfulness has become one of the most widespread clinical and research proposals of the last three decades, and its best-known definition in the West, Jon Kabat-Zinn’s, describes it as paying attention in a particular way, on purpose, in the present moment and non-judgementally. Less attention has gone to the question of where we stand when we understand that practice. Many Western epistemological models share two qualities that make their contact with mindfulness difficult. They are disembodied theories, built after the experience and as if in the third person, and most of them are dualist, which means they split experience into self and world, or subject and object. In my master’s thesis, and later in an article with Claudio Araya-Véliz and Roberto Aristegui (Fuentes-Ferrada et al., 2024), I tried to propose a different place to stand.
Two paths that had not met
That place starts from relational enaction, a perspective that continues the work of the Chilean biologist and thinker Francisco Varela and that understands experience as something that unfolds in relationship, with one’s own body and with others, rather than as an internal representation of the world. Although this perspective has a growing body of research and training, it inherits the same challenge that was put to Varela, that of its epistemological clarity and consistency. The question I asked myself was whether there is ground on which mindfulness and relational enaction can meet without getting caught in the modern search for single, stable truths, and also without falling into the dissolution of every point of reference.
Analogical hermeneutics, developed by the Mexican philosopher Mauricio Beuchot, offers that ground, as I see it. It proposes interpreting through analogy, which sits in an intermediate place between the univocity of objectivist approaches (a single valid reading) and the equivocity of subjectivism (every reading is worth the same). Far from merging opposites into a synthesis that resolves them, analogy lets tensions coexist and prudently marks the limits of what can be interpreted. What drew me in was that both developments, the enactive and the analogical, had followed separate paths even though they share a way of looking, attentive to the microprocesses of an embodied interpretation that happens somewhere as close as one’s own body and as near as the other person.
Three contributions
Three contributions came out of that meeting. The first is analogical realism as an epistemic place from which the enactive programme can continue, one that avoids both ultimate foundations and nihilism. The second is a notion of the analogical self, located between the pre-reflective quality of experience (in the line of Merleau-Ponty and Vittorio Guidano) and its relational and narrative extension. The third is methodological, and I called it analogical dialogue, a form of conversation in which the monological, the dialogical and the bodily register are brought in deliberately and in sequence, putting first, second and third person experience into interaction. It can support inquiry in therapeutic or group settings related to mindfulness and compassion.
These proposals have limitations that I acknowledged then and still hold. The categories of analogical hermeneutics may feel distant to people who facilitate groups or do therapy. Analogical realism may be mistaken for naive realism. And analogical dialogue has not yet been formally researched, so its strengths and limits should be explored with mixed methods. Even so, I believe the epistemological discussion has practical consequences. Someone who teaches mindfulness from a dualist assumption tends to present it as a technique that a subject applies to their mental contents. Someone who understands it in a relational and embodied way presents it as a practice and also as a way of being with others and with oneself.
Why it still matters to me
Today I work with data, statistical models and repeated measurements in daily life, and it might seem that those concerns are behind me. For me it is the other way round. The prudence that analogy proposes, understood as a way of relating to reality without rigidity and without laxity, is the same one I try to keep when I interpret a coefficient or listen to someone’s story, and it remains a good description of what it means to research human experience from the South.
References
Fuentes-Ferrada, R., Araya-Véliz, C., & Aristegui, R. (2024). Relational enaction and analogical hermeneutics: A possible epistemological path as a middle way for relational enactive mindfulness. International Journal of Health Science, 4(100), 1-21. https://doi.org/10.22533/at.ed.159410024181110